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FLORIDA'S EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT: HOW
THE COURTS AND DOAH HAVE INTERPRETED IT
MARY W. CHAISSON
I. INTRODUCTION
F LORIDA'S Equal Access to Justice Act' provides for the award of
reasonable attorney's fees and costs up to $15,000 incurred de-
fending in any adjudicatory or administrative proceeding to a prevail-
ing small business party. The proceeding must have been initiated by a
state agency, and the actions of the agency must not have been sub-
stantially justified. Additionally, there must have been no special cir-
cumstances that would make the award unjust.
2
The Act was designed to encourage small business parties to seek
review of or defend against unwarranted government action by pro-
viding for attorney's fees and costs against the State in certain situa-
tions.' The Legislature sought to provide "a partial remedy for those
too frequent situations where small businesses find opposing state
agency action too expensive even when the state agency action may
appear to be totally unjustified."14 By requiring each state agency to
report annually any awards under the Act to the Legislature, s the stat-
ute also curbs any tendency of state agencies to wield their substantial
regulatory powers unwisely or unfairly.
Although the Act became effective in 1984, there have been only a
handful of appellate cases6 and surprisingly few petitions filed with
the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH).7 No one need fear
that the floodgates of litigation were opened by its enactment. One
commentator has called the Equal Access to Justice Act a "sword for
1. FLA. STAT. § 57.111 (1989).
2. Id. § 57.111(4)(a), (4)(d)(2).
3. Id. § 57.111(2).
4. City of Naples Airport Auth. v. Collier Dev. Corp., 515 So. 2d 1060, (Fla. 2d DCA
1987).
5. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(7) (1989).
6. There have been only five cases discussing the Act to any significant extent. See Depart-
ment of Prof. Reg. v. Toledo Realty, 549 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Ist DCA 1989); Thompson v. Depart-
ment of HRS, 533 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Department of HRS v. A.F., 528 So. 2d 87
(Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Gentele v. Department of Prof. Reg., 513 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987);
City of Naples Airport Auth. v. Collier Dev. Corp., 515 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
7. Many of these petitions will be discussed in this Comment.
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small business." ' Another expressed doubt that the Act provided any
real remedy to small businesses forced to defend against agency ac-
tions.9
This Comment will examine the Act's requirements and the proce-
dure to be followed by parties petitioning for attorney's fees and
costs, the appellate cases and DOAH final orders issued interpreting
the terminology of the Act, and the persuasive value of the interpreta-
tions given in these final orders. It will ultimately address whether the




The Florida Equal Access to Justice Act 10 was originally enacted by
the Florida Legislature in 1984"1 and has received two minor revisions
since then, both in 1987. Section 43 of chapter 87-612 added a para-
graph codified at section 57.111(3)(d)2.1 3 This addition expanded the
Act to allow recovery by a new class of small business parties. This
has triggered few, if any, additional petitions. Section 7 of chapter 87-
224'4 reworded one sentence in order to improve clarity and promote
proper interpretation. 5
B. Impact of the Act on Related Statutes
Even before the Act's enactment in 1984, a party recovering a judg-
ment against the State or a state agency could recover costs under sec-
8. E. Clint Smawley, The Florida Equal Access to Justice Act: A Sword for Small Busi-
ness in Civil Proceedings Initiated by State Agencies, 7 FLA. B.J. ADumR. L. SEC. NEWSL. 2
(1986).
9. David L. Powell, Rights and Duties of Vendors and Government Agencies Under Flori-
da's New Public Contracting Law, 17 FiA. ST. U. L. REv. 481, 510 n.181 (1990). The Act's bar
to recovery if the agency's actions were substantially justified or if special circumstances exist
that would make the award unjust was seen as rendering the remedy "more theoretical than
real." Id.
10. FA. STAT. § 57.111 (1989).
11. Ch. 84-78, §§ 1-6, 1984 Fla. Laws 200, 200, 202.
12. Ch. 87-6 § 43, 1987 Fla. Laws 9, 66.
13. It stated:
3. Either small business party as defined in subparagraph 1, without regard to the
number of its employees or its net worth, in any action under s. 72.011 or in any
administrative proceeding under that section and s. 120.575(1)(b) to contest the legal-
ity of any assessment of tax imposed for the sale or use of services as provided in
chapter 212, or interest thereon, or penalty therefor.
FiA. STAT. § 57.111(3)(d)(2) (1989).
14. 1987 Fla. Laws 1375, 1380.
15. "(3)(c) A small business party is a 'prevailing small business party' when: ...." Id.
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tion 57.041, Florida Statutes. 6 Section 57.111 is an alternative for
small businesses 17 that might otherwise recover fees and costs under
section 57.041. The $15,000 maximum established for recovery under
section 57.111 does not limit a cost award under section 57.041.18 Nor
does section 57.111 have any impact on the award of costs in a juve-
nile proceeding.' 9 Rather the Act provides for the award of costs and
attorney's fees in some situations where such awards were not previ-
ously available. For instance, section 57.111 provides for costs and
attorney's fees in purely administrative actions, while section 57.041
awards are available only in judicial actions.20
C. Summary of the Act
Section 57.111(4)(a) succinctly summarizes the main thrust of the
Act as follows:
(4)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, an award of attorney's fees
and costs shall be made to a prevailing small business party in any
adjudicatory proceeding or administrative proceeding pursuant to
chapter 120 initiated by a state agency, unless the actions of the
agency were substantially justified or special circumstances exist
which would make the award unjust.
21
The remainder of the Act explicates and implements this legislative
goal. The rest of subsection 4 sets out the procedures to be followed
both by petitioners in applying for attorney's fees and costs, and by
state agencies in responding to an application. Section 57.111(3) de-
fines the terms used in section 57.111(4)(a), including "attorney's fees
and costs," "initiated by a state agency," "prevailing small business
party," "small business party," and "substantially justified." Sub-
section 5 sets out the procedure the petitioner should follow if the
agency falls to pay the award within thirty days, and subsection 6 ex-
cludes certain State actions from application of the Act. Finally, sub-
section 7 establishes the procedure to be followed by state agencies in
reporting the amounts paid to the Legislature.
Failure to comply with the procedural guidelines set out in the Act
or to conform to one of the defined categories can be fatal to a peti-
16. City of Naples Airport Auth. v. Collier Dev. Corp., 515 So. 2d 1058, 1059 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1987); see also Simpson v. Merrill, 234 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1970).
17. Collier Dev. Corp., 515 So. 2d at 1059.
18. Id.
19. Department of HRS v. A.F., 528 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
20. Id.
21. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(a) (1989).
19911
904 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 19:901
tioner's application.22 Practitioners advising clients who have already
successfully challenged agency actions, as well as those who are only
considering opposing agency action in the hope of being at least partly
reimbursed once they are vindicated, are exhorted to consider each
section as it has been laid out by the Legislature, as it has been more
broadly explained in Rule 221-6.035 of the Florida Administrative
Code, and as it has been interpreted by the courts and DOAH in ap-
plicable case law and administrative decisions.
D. Persuasive Value of DOAH Final Orders
Before there can be a petition for attorney's fees and costs under
the Act, there must have been some underlying agency action that was
"initiated" by the agency.23
Section 57.111(3)(b) contemplates that the underlying action to a
petition will originate either in a court or in an administrative pro-
ceeding under chapter 120.24 Section 57.111(4)(b)(1) requires the pre-
vailing party's attorney to submit an itemized affidavit to the court
that conducted the underlying proceeding or, for chapter 120 proceed-
ings, to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Therefore, the peti-
tion for fees is submitted to the tribunal that presided over the action
giving rise to the petition. The Act further provides for a prompt evi-
dentiary hearing on the application. 25 The court then issues a judg-
ment or, in the case of an administrative hearing, the hearing officer
issues a final order. A final order of a hearing officer is reviewable in
accordance with the provisions of section 120.68.26 A petition under
the Act, then, may end up with either a judgment (if the underlying
cause was in court) or a final order (if the underlying cause was ad-
ministrative action).
As there are so few appellate decisions that even discuss the Act,
much less devote much time to interpreting it, and most of the deci-
sions interpreting the Act are final orders, the issue of how much per-
suasive value such a final order has is relevant in deciding how much
weight to accord to these administrative determinations. This is a mul-
tifaceted issue involving: (1) what binding effect the interpretation of
22. See infra notes 34-187 and accompanying text.
23. FLA. STAT. § 57.111 (4)(a).
24. Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA
establishes the procedures to be followed by state agencies in adopting rules and by parties af-
fected by agency actions in seeking review of a wide range of agency actions.
25. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(d) (1989).
26. Id.
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a DOAH hearing officer has on a subsequent interpretation of the
same provision by the same or a different DOAH hearing officer, and
(2) what standard of judicial review is proper on appeal.
Section 57.111(4)(d) provides some guidance on the latter concern.
It specifies: "[T]he final order of a hearing officer is reviewable in
accordance with the provisions of s. 120.68."27 Section 120.68(2) in
turn provides for appellate review by the district court of appeal in the
appellate district where the state agency has its headquarters or where
a party resides, except for those matters calling for judicial review by
the supreme court. Proceedings are conducted under the Florida Rules
of Appellate Procedure.2
The reviewing court deals separately with disputed issues of agency
procedure, interpretations of law, fact determinations, or policy
within the agency's discretion.29 Additionally, section 120.68 requires
the court to remand the case to the agency for further action if a ma-
terial error in or a failure to follow procedure may have impaired the
fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action. The court
must either set aside or modify the agency action or remand the case
to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the
provision of law if it finds that the agency has erroneously interpreted
a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels a particu-
lar action. 0
The Legislature then, by providing that final orders of hearing offi-
cers are reviewable in accordance with section 120.68, has established
a restrictive scope of judicial review of these orders. 31
Additionally, the Florida courts have applied "certain well estab-
lished judicial principles" to administrative proceedings. 32 Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Barr33 established that final
orders of agencies are stare decisis to later actions of the agency.34 The
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel also are applicable to
final agency action.3 5
27. Id.
28. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(2) (1989).
29. Id. § 120.68(7) (1989).
30. Id. § 120.68(8), (9) (1989).
31. See Florida Real Estate Comm'n v. Webb, 367 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 1978); see also Fort
Pierce Util. Auth. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 388 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980).
32. Couch v. Department of HRS, 377 So. 2d 32, 33 (Fla. Ist DCA 1979).
33. 359 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
34. Accord Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973);
UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972); City of Miami Beach v. Miller, 122 So.
2d 578, 580-81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960).
35. Department of HRS v. Professional Firefighters, 366 So. 2d 1276, 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA
1979); see also Thomson v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 511 So. 2d 989, 991 (Fla. 1987); DeBusk
v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 327, 328-29 (Fla. 1980); Jet Air Freight v. Jet Air Freight Delivery, 264 So.
2d 35, 40 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 267 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1972).
1991]
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Generally, while a previous final order of a hearing officer does not
have the binding effect on an administrative hearing officer as does
the decision of a court, it does have some precedential value in guid-
ing the officer's conclusions of law. Indeed, the final orders in the
area show that hearing officers frequently cite to the final orders of
other hearing officers interpreting the statute.3 6 When an apparent
conflict with a previous final order arises, an officer often will distin-
guish the cases in order to maintain consistency of interpretation,
much like a court would with conflicting case law.
37
Therefore, while much of the case law interpreting Florida's Equal
Access to Justice Act is not case law at all, but final orders of DOAH
hearing officers, these orders are indicative of how hearing officers
and appellate courts are likely to interpret the Act in the future.
III. TERKMOLOGY
The statute uses words in common usage but with specialized mean-
ings under the Act. Therefore, to more accurately predict one's
chances of a recovery under the Act, it is necessary to examine how
the Act, the applicable case law, and the applicable administration de-
cisions have defined these terms.
A. "Attorney's Fees and Costs"
Subsection 57.111(3)(a) defines "attorney's fees and costs" as "the
reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs incurred for all pre-
parations, motions, hearings, trials and appeals in a proceeding." The
precise meaning of this definition was at issue in Heisler v. Depart-
ment of Professional Regulation.3 8 There the Board filed an adminis-
trative complaint against a contractor, alleging statutory violations.
Five days before the scheduled formal hearing in the matter the Board
filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice with
DOAH. 39 Six months later the Board filed an amended administrative
complaint alleging additional statutory violations based upon the
same set of facts. 4° After a formal hearing on the amended adminis-
trative complaint, the complaint was dismissed with prejudice and the
36. See generally Rudloe v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 33 Fla. Supp. 2d 203, 210-12
(DOAH 1988); Home Health Care v. Department of HRS, 33 Fla. Supp. 2d 169, 178 (DOAH
1988); Gentele v. Department of Prof. Reg., 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 311, 323, 327 (1986), aff'd
513 So. 2d 673 (Fla. Ist DCA 1987).
37. See, e.g., Alfert v. Division of Real Estate, 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5201, 5207 (1988).
38. 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3309 (1989).
39. Id. at 3310.
40. Id.at3310-11.
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contractor petitioned for the fees and costs he incurred in defending
against both the original and the amended administrative com-
plaints .
41
The hearing officer awarded only those fees and costs incurred in
defense of the amended complaint.42 She reasoned that the sixty days
statutory filing time had elapsed between the time the original com-
plaint was dismissed and the time the amended complaint was filed.
Therefore, the contractor was, barred from recovering his attorney's
fees and costs in defending against the original administrative com-
plaint by the statute itself.43 More importantly, however, the contrac-
tor might have been reimbursed for attorney's fees and costs incurred
before the date on which the second complaint was issued if he had
presented evidence that specific services, although performed during
the pendency of the first case, were used in the defense of the second
case. 44 In addition, those expenses incurred for services performed af-
ter the issuance of the recommended order as well as attorney's fees
incurred in litigating entitlement to attorney's fees and costs, were
also awarded.
45
Therefore, a prevailing party may be reimbursed for all necessary
and reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against
agency action. The party may even recover fees and costs incurred in
an earlier action never clearly resolved if the attorney's work product
is used in a later successful defense. The key is presenting adequate
evidence of the use and adequate documentation of the time spent on
the various motions and pleadings.
B. "Initiated by a State Agency"
Under section 57.111(3)(b), a state agency initiated the underlying
proceeding if it:
1. Filed the first pleading in any state or federal court in this state;
2. Filed a request for an administrative hearing pursuant to chapter
120; or
3. Was required by law or rule to advise a small business party of a
clear point of entry after some recognizable event in the investigatory
or other free-form proceeding of the agency."
41. Id.at3311.
42. Id. at 3317, 3322.
43. Id. at 3321. Subparagraph 57.111(4)(b)2 provides: "The application for an award of
attorney's fees must be made within 60 days after the date that the small business party becomes
a prevailing small business party." FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(b)2 (1989).
44. Heisler, 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 3321.
45. Id.
46. Fa. STAT. § 57.111(3)(b) (1989).
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When a state agency initiates an action by filing in court or request-
ing an administrative hearing, it is easy to determine that the agency
has initiated the action. The issue, when it has come up, is usually
whether the state agency was required to advise a small business party
of a clear point of entry.47 Therefore, if a party is entitled to a clear
point of entry under chapter 120, as this has been interpreted by the
courts and DOAH, the resulting formal proceeding was "initiated by
a state agency."
The language in paragraph (3) has been equated to an agency's fil-
ing of an administrative complaint with an election of rights form.
48
In Department of Professional Regulation v. Andrews, the hearing of-
ficer dismissed the petition for attorney's fees and costs for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because the complaints against petitioners
were filed on June 7 and 11, 1984, and the Act applies only to actions
initiated by state agencies after July 1, 1984.49 In a closer case, the
hearing officer declined to decide whether an action had been initiated
before or after the effective date when the administrative complaint
had been issued before July 1, 1984, but the election of rights form
had not been signed nor the cause transmitted to DOAH until after
that date. 0 She chose instead to dismiss because the petition had been
filed more than sixty days after the agency filed its voluntary dis-
missal.5 1
The question of whether an administrative complaint filed before
the effective date of the Act with an election of rights form dated
after that date would be covered remains open and is quite probably
moot. The amount of time that has passed since the effective date of
the Act makes it increasingly less likely that a petitioner will seek to
recover fees and costs for state action initiated before or near that
date. This does not mean, however, that the issue of whether an ac-
tion was initiated by a state agency is no longer important, for in or-
der to recover under the Act, the petitioner must plead and prove that
the agency was the initiator.5 2
47. Capeletti Bros. v. Department of Transp., 362 So. 2d 346, 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
This language is further evidence that a strong link between chapter 120 and the Act was in-
tended by the Legislature. The close relationship between the two statutes was quite likely moti-
vated by a desire to provide some extra measure of protection to those who must rely on the
fairness of state agencies. See City of Naples Airport Auth. v. Collier Dev. Corp., 515 So. 2d
1058, 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
48. Department of Prof. Reg. v. Andrews, 7 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1298, 1300 (1985).
49. Id. at 1300-01; FLA. STAT. § 57.111(6)(b) (1989).
50. Rindley v. Department of Prof. Reg., 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 302, 304 (1986).
51. Id. at 305.
52. See Department of Prof. Reg. v. Toledo Realty, 549 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 1st DCA
1989).
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Home Health Care v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services" established that a party applying for a permit or other certi-
fication, although taking the first action, is not initiating the subse-
quent state action so as to be excluded from recovery under the Act.
There, a home nursing facility's initial application for a certificate of
need from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services was
denied, but it was later granted after a formal administrative hear-
ing.5 4 The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services argued
that it had not initiated the underlying proceeding, but the hearing
officer ruled that the denial of the certificate constituted initiation of
the action by the Department.5
An agency may initiate action in proposing to grant or deny an ap-
plication. In Rudloe v. Department of Environmental Regulation,
5 6
Gulf Specimen, a laboratory specimen company, and Rudloe, an indi-
vidual, petitioned after successfully challenging in formal administra-
tive proceedings DER's intent to grant a dredge and fill permit to
Dickerson Bayshore, Inc. The Department argued that it had fur-
nished Gulf notice of its intent to grant solely because Gulf had re-
quested notice and not because it was required to advise Gulf of a
clear point of entry pursuant to chapter 120.17 The hearing officer dis-
agreed. He found that Gulf and Rudloe had pleaded and proved spe-
cial, substantial interests differing from those of the public at large
and that a "party whose substantial interests are to be determined by
agency action has a legal right to participate in formal adjudicatory
proceedings before action is taken, when material facts are dis-
puted." 5 8
It is likely then that parties with adequate standing to obtain a sec-
tion 120.57 hearing to protest or support agency action will later be
able to show that the agency "initiated" the action within the mean-
ing of section 57.111(3)(b)3. This is a natural and, no doubt, intended
result of the Legislature's choosing to use the "clear point of entry"
language.
C. "Small Business Party"
Three classes of individuals or companies are classified as small
business parties under the Act:
53. 33 Fla. Supp. 2d 169 (DOAH 1988).
54. Id. at 171-72.
55. Id. at 176.
56. 33 Fla. Supp. 2d 203 (DOAH 1988).
57. Id. at 208.
58. Id. at 209 (citing Surface Water Management Permit No. 50-01420-S, 515 So. 2d 1288
(Fla. 4th DCA 1987)); NME Hospitals, Inc. v. Department of HRS, 492 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1986); Capeletti Bros. v. Department of Transp., 362 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978);
Gadsden State Bank v. Lewis, 348 So. 2d 343 (Fla. Ist DCA 1977).
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1. a. A sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a
professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is
domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice
has, at the time the action is initiated by a state agency, not more
than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2
million, including both personal and business investments; or
b. A partnership or corporation, including a professional practice,
which has its principal office in this state and has at the time the
action is initiated by a state agency not more than 25 full-time
employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million; or
2. Either small business party as defined in subparagraph 1., without
regard to the number of its employees or its net worth, in any action
under s. 72.011 or in any administrative proceeding under that
section and s. 120.575(l)(b) to contest the legality of any assessment
of tax imposed for the sale or use of services as provided in chapter
212, or interest thereon, or penalty therefor.
5 9
Department of Professional Regulation v. Toledo Realty, Inc.60 es-
tablished that an employee of a small business party is not himself or
herself a small business party. The court relied on Thompson v. De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services.6' While the court did
not address the apparent conflict between its decision and the decision
in McCallister v. Department of State,62 the hearing officer in Alfert
v. Division of Real Estate,63 whose conclusion that Alfert was not a
small business party was affirmed by the court in Toledo, stated that
"McCalister is either distinguishable from the facts herein or is
founded on an erroneous construction of the law."6
In McCallister the petitioner was a licensed polygraph examiner and
the sole proprietor of McCallister Polygraph Service, Inc. He was also
employed by the Polk County Sheriff's Office as a sworn officer serv-
ing as staff polygraphist. Although the actions giving rise to the ad-
ministrative complaint took place when he was performing his duties
for the Sheriff's office, he incurred the attorney's fees and costs as a
result of the Division of Licensing seeking to revoke his detection of
deception examiner's license. The legislative intent of the Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act was to encourage professionals licensed by the
59. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(3)(d) (1989). The Act is not the only statute providing for attor-
ney's fees or costs to successful litigants against state agencies. See FIA. STAT. §§ 57.041, .105
(1989).
60. 549 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
61. 533 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (A State employee involved in a regulatory proceed-
ing to determine his eligibility for continued employment is not a small business party.).
62. 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4064 (1987).
63. 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5201 (1988).
64. Id. at 5208.
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State to seek administrative review of agency actions.65 In seeking to
revoke his license, the Division sought to discipline him as a "sole
proprietor of a professional practice." The hearing officer concluded
that "a literal interpretation of a statute need not be given when to do
so would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion" and
found that Mr. McCallister was a small business party as required by
the statute.67
McCallister and Toledo are distinguishable on their facts. In Toledo
Mr. Alfert was a licensed real estate broker, but he did not own his
own business. He was simply an employee. Mr. McCallister, however,
was the sole proprietor of his own business and so met the statutory
definition for a small business party.
In another case it was found that a person who seeks an initial li-
cense to care for agency-assigned children is a small business party.68
The hearing officer in Miller v. Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services reasoned: "It is clearly the legislative intent ... that a
sole proprietor, with a net worth not exceeding $2 million,... offer-
ing his services to the general public would qualify as a 'small business
party' if disciplinary proceedings against his license were instituted by
the State." 69 She then went one step further and addressed whether a
license applicant denied licensure is a small business party if going
into business is dependent upon the grant of the license that has been
denied. Reading sections 57.111(3)(d) and (3)(b)3 in conjunction, she
found that the statute "provides a 'window,' for those sole proprie-
tors, such as Petitioner whose license applications have been denied.
Concomitantly, they are likewise entitled to attorney's fees and costs
where all other criteria are met.' '70
Finally, in determining whether a corporation is a small business
party within the meaning of the statute, the corporate party need only
show that it had twenty-five or fewer full-time employees at the time
the agency action was initiated or that its net worth was $2,000,000 or
less. "Or" is the operative word. Exceeding only one of these maxi-
mums is not enough to disqualify the corporation as a small business
party under the Act. 71
65. McCallister, 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 4067-68.
66. Id. at 4069 (citations omitted).
67. Id.
68. Miller v. Department of HRS, 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5160 (1987).
69. Id. at 5165.
70. Id. at 5166.
71. See Home Health Care v. Department of HRS, 33 Fla. Supp. 2d 169, 175 (DOAH
1988).
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While Toledo provides that licensed realtors employed by real estate
companies are not small business parties within the meaning of the
Act, at least to the extent that they do not own their own small busi-
ness on the side, its applicability to other licensed professionals em-
ployed by others remains unsettled. It is clear that a party may qualify
as a small business if it meets either the economic or size criterion.
D. "Prevailing Small Business Party"
A small business party is "prevailing" when:
1. A final judgment or order has been entered in favor of the small
business party and such judgment or order has not been reversed on
appeal or the time for seeking judicial review of the judgment or
order has expired;
2. A settlement has been obtained by the small business party which
is favorable to the small business party on the majority of issues
which such party raised during the course of the proceeding; or
3. The state agency has sought a voluntary dismissal of its
complaint 2.7
Briggs v. Department of Professional Regulation 3 addressed the
question of when a final judgment or order is favorable to a small
business party. In the case giving rise to the petition, the Real Estate
Commission's final order found the subsequent petitioners guilty of
violating chapter 475 by forging a client's signature on a contract 74
and imposed a six-month license suspension. The suspension was de-
pendent upon payment of a $1,000 civil penalty.75 This penalty was
imposed for violation of one count of a two count complaint; the par-
ties were found not guilty on the remaining charges. Nevertheless, the
hearing officer dismissed the petition for fees and costs, concluding
that "neither the Recommended Order or Final Order reflects any
'approval' of Respondent's conduct as reflected by the penalty as-
sessed.'' 76
A real estate broker's petition for attorney's fees and costs was sim-
ilarly denied because she had not prevailed in the initial proceeding.
She had asserted that the final order was favorable to her because two
of the charges against her had been dismissed. She was found guilty
72. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(3)(c) (1989).
73. 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 795 (1986).
74. Id. at 796-97.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 799.
77. Ruffin v. Department of Prof. Reg., 8 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1312 (1986).
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on two other counts and assessed penalties. The hearing officer ruled
that the criterion of prevailing on a majority of the issues litigated
applies only in cases where a settlement has been obtained and has no
application to cases where a final order has been issued.
78
Assad v. Department of Professional Regulation,79 like Briggs° and
Ruffin," was based on a license discipline proceeding, but the Board
and Assad entered into a settlement before the hearing on the admin-
istrative complaint in which the Board agreed to dismiss all of its
charges against him. The final order on Assad's petition addressed the
issue of when a settlement is favorable as well as demonstrating the
overlap between 57.111(3)(c)2 and (3)(c)3. In denying Assad's peti-
tion, the hearing officer found "a settlement wherein the Petitioner
agrees to be subjected to four (4) of the six (6) possible penalties...
is not a 'favorable settlement' . *...-82
Therefore, a party is not necessarily "prevailing" if the agency dis-
misses all of its complaints pursuant to a settlement agreement in
which the party does not prevail on a majority of the issues. When the
party is a professional licensee and the underlying agency action is the
filing of an administrative complaint, the standard is probably close
to complete victory or failure.
The decision in Rudloe 3 illustrates how the cases have dealt with
the issue of when a settlement is "favorable" on a "majority of is-
sues" outside of the license discipline context. There the petitioners
applied for attorney's fees and costs after they successfully opposed
the Department of Environmental Regulation's intent to grant a
dredge and fill permit to a company hoping to build a marina. DER
argued that the petitioners were not prevailing small business parties
because they did not prevail on every issue litigated. The hearing offi-
cer rejected this argument, stating: "Although Gulf did not prevail on
every issue litigated, it obtained a favorable result. This is not a case
where a party prevailed on one, but not all, of multiple counts liti-
gated in a single proceeding.' '84
A different standard seems to be used in license discipline cases
than in other areas for determining whether a particular outcome was
favorable to a small business party. A licensee must be more unequi-
vocably the winner than other parties taking on state agencies in order
78. Id. at 1316.
79. 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4076 (1987).
80. 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 795 (1986).
81. 8 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1312 (1986).
82. Assad, 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 4082-83.
83. 33 Fla. Supp. 2d 203 (DOAH 1988).
84. Id. at 210.
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to be found the "prevailing" party. This is balanced by a heavier bur-
den being placed on state agencies in proving substantial justification
for their actions.
8 5
Heisler v. Department of Professional Regulation86 stands for the
proposition that a small business party can prevail even before the
state agency files its final order in the underlying cause. Mr. Heisler, a
residential air conditioning contractor, filed a petition for fees and
costs after the Construction Industry Licensing Board adopted the
recommended order in his favor at its board meeting but before the
Board issued its final order.87 After the period for responding to the
petitioner's allegations had expired, DPR alleged that the petitioner
was not yet a prevailing party because no final order had yet been
issued. The hearing officer found that the petitioner became a prevail-
ing small business party when the Board adopted the recommended
order and, therefore, his filing the petition before the filing of the
final order was not fatal to his petition. 88
The hearing officer reasoned that allowing a state agency or board
to insulate itself from paying attorney's fees by failing to enter a final
order would run counter to legislative intent.8 9 Significantly, the hear-
ing officer found that the Board was "violating Section 120.59(1),
Florida Statutes, by failing and/or refusing to enter its final or-
der . . . 90
The applicable standard used in determining whether a party pre-
vailed then may depend on the nature of the underlying cause of ac-
tion, with a stricter standard being applied in license discipline cases
than in other cases. Further, there is some flexibility built in as to
when a party becomes a prevailing party. Filing before the agency is-
sues its final order will not defeat a valid claim.
E. "Substantially Justified"
By far the most frequently disputed issue in cases under the Act is
whether the initial proceeding was substantially justified. A proceed-
ing is substantially justified if "it had a reasonable basis in law and
fact at the time it was initiated by a state agency.''91 This has been
equated by the courts and DOAH with a valid probable cause deter-
85. See infra notes 87-136 and accompanying text.
86. I1 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3309 (1989).
87. Id. at 3319.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 3318.
90. Id.
91. FiA. STAT. § 57.111(3)(e) (1989).
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mination before issuance of an administrative complaint or other ac-
tion by the state agency.92
In the license discipline context at least, a valid probable cause de-
termination rests upon consideration of some evidence "that would
reasonably indicate that the violations alleged had indeed occurred.
93
In order to determine whether agency action was substantially justi-
fied then, several threshold issues must first be addressed. At what
point during the evaluation of the underlying cause must the agency's
actions have been substantially justified? How substantial is substan-
tial? Who bears the burden of proving substantial justification?
1. When Must the Agency's Actions be Substantially Justified?
The Act specifies that the agency action must have a reasonable ba-
sis in law and fact "at the time it was initiated" to be substantially
justified. 94 In the license discipline and permitting settings, the rele-
vant period is the point at which the agency made the decision to issue
an administrative complaint against a licensee or to grant or deny a
permit application.
95
In one of the few appellate cases in this area, the First District
Court of Appeal affirmed the hearing officer's denial of attorney's
fees and costs to an optometrist who won in the underlying cause. In
the formal hearing on the administrative complaint against the optom-
etrist, the Board of Optometry presented the testimony of a DPR in-
vestigator who had visited Dr. Gentele in the guise of a patient after
an actual patient lodged a complaint against him. The hearing officer
recommended that the Board dismiss the count of its complaint based
on the investigator's testimony, finding that her testimony was not
credible. However, this finding did not mean that the agency's actions
in initiating the complaint were not substantially justified. The court
reasoned that DPR's decision to prosecute the complaint was based
on a credibility assessment of the investigator's testimony. As such, its
action had a reasonable basis in law and fact.9
The hearing officer in Romaguera v. Department of Professional
Regulation 7 explained what is statutorily required in an agency's de-
termination of probable cause:
92. See, e.g., Department of Prof. Reg. v. Toledo Realty, 549 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA
1989); Gentele v. Department of Prof. Reg., 513 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
93. Kibler v. Department of Prof. Reg., 418 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); see,
e.g., Gentele v. Department of Prof. Reg., 513 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
94. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(3)(e) (1989).
95. See Gentele v. Department of Prof. Reg., 513 So. 2d 672 (Fla. Ist DCA 1987); Union
Trucking v. Department of Transp., 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 6039 (1988).
96. Gentele, 513 So. 2d at 673.
97. 10 FIa. Admin. L. Rep. 929, 933 (1988).
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In clear terms, then, the legislature has directed the trier of fact to
determine what data or advice the agency relied upon when it
initiated a proceeding against a licensee .... Under the existing
statutory scheme ... a probable cause panel, made up of three
members of the Board, has the statutory duty of examining
complaints brought to its attention and determining whether they
warrant a finding of probable cause against a licensee. Therefore, it
is this phase of a Board proceeding, and not the final hearing on the
merits, that Subsection 57.111(3)(c) mandates be reviewed in order to
adjudicate a claim for attorney's fees and costs.98
The hearing officer found that the agency's actions were not sub-
stantially justified because the agency presented no evidence to show
what information, if any, the probable cause panel had considered
when making its determination that probable cause existed to believe
Dr. Romaguera had violated the licensing statute. Although the
agency was able to procure expert witnesses after the proceeding was
initiated to support its position, this was insufficient to "sanitize its
failure" to "document the probable cause phase (initiation) of the
proceeding. '" 99
However, the probable cause requirement is a two-edged sword.
The agency's decision to initiate an action is substantially justified
even if the agency presents little or no evidence at the final hearing on
the merits. If it can show that the decision of its probable cause panel
was substantially justified, the agency will be statutorily insulated
against a claim for fees and costs. 100
For purposes of the grant or denial of permits or applications then,
the relevant time period to consider is the time of the agency's grant
or denial. Subsequent changes in the law or agency rules or policies
that would render previously justified actions unjustifiable have no
impact on the determination of substantial justification.
For example, in Union Trucking, Inc. v. Department of Transpor-
tation,101 a trucking company that had initially been denied certifica-
tion as a minority business enterprise was later granted the
certification after a change in the agency's rules. However, the De-
partment did not formally decide to grant the certification until five
months after the rule change and, as a result, the trucking company
was "forced to proceed for several months in preparation for an ac-
tion which [the Department] admits it had no basis for after the rule
98. Romaguera v. Department of Prof. Reg., 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 929, 933 (1988).
99. Id. at 934.
100. Id. at 934 n.5.
101. 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 6039 (1988).
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change took effect."' 10 2 Nevertheless, the hearing officer found that
the agency's denial was justified under the old rules as of the date it
first denied the company's request for certification. Because the truck-
ing company "failed to demonstrate any facts regarding the likelihood
of adoption of the rule change" at that time, its petition for attor-
ney's fees and costs was denied. 0
In Rudloe v. Department of Environmental Regulation"1 petition-
ers had successfully blocked the grant of a dredge and fill permit to
another company. Because the questions DER had to address in
reaching a grant or deny decision were so complex, the absence of any
evidence to the contrary was sufficient to support a finding that
DER's actions were substantially justified. 05 In finding that DER's
actions had been substantially justified because "[n]othing in the rec-
ord supports the view that the original intent to grant was irrational or
unconsidered," ' 1 6 the hearing officer reasoned that, "[t]he Act is de-
signed to discourage unreasonable governmental action, not to para-
lyze agencies doing the necessary and beneficial work of
government."'1
0 7
2. How Substantial is Substantial?
"[T]he mere existence of a justiciable issue is not ... sufficient ba-
sis to avoid an award of fees and costs.' ' 0 8 Nevertheless, "[t]he fact
that the government lost its case does not raise a presumption that the
government's position was not substantially justified. Nor is the gov-
ernment required to establish that its decision to litigate was based on
a substantial probability of prevailing." 19
102. Id. at 6041.
103. Id. at 6043.
104. Rudloe, 33 Fla. Supp. 2d 203 (DOAH 1988).
105. Id. at 211.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Alario v. Department of Prof. Reg., 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2134, 2145 (1988).
109. Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843, 850 (11th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). The
hearing officer in Structured Shelters Fin. Management, Inc. v. Department of Banking & Fi-
nance, 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 382 (1988), relied on Ashburn: "It is also instructive to look to
the decisions of federal courts which have construed the meaning of the language of the federal
legislation on which the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act is modeled." Id. at 389. The court
in Gentele validated this approach:
The FEAJA is modeled after the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 504.
We have recognized that "[i]f a Florida statute is patterned after a federal law, on the
same subject, it will take the same construction in the Florida courts as its prototype
has been given in the federal courts insofar as such construction is harmonious with
the spirit and policy of Florida legislation on the subject."
Gentele v. Department of Prof. Reg., 513 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
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The hearing officer in Alario v. Department of Professional
Regulation" described the appropriate standard for award as "less
strict than the '. . . complete absence of a justiciable issue of either
law or fact' found in section 57.105111 as being "somewhere between
the Section 57.105, F.S. standard and the automatic award of fees to
a prevailing party.' 12 In the case giving rise to Alario, the Florida
Real Estate Commission filed an administrative complaint against a
broker and a real estate company for alleged violations of chapter 475
and Commission rules." 3 A large part of the Commission's evidence
against the broker was the complaint and judgment from a prior civil
case in which the broker and the real estate company had been sued
for share of a commission.
11 4
The Commission failed to prove that its actions were substantially
justified because DPR presented no independent evidence that a co-
broker agreement between the plaintiffs in the underlying civil action
and the petitioners even existed or that the petitioners ever received
the disputed commission." 5 The hearing officer reasoned that the
stricter standard of proof in a license proceeding made the agency's
reliance on a prior civil judgment inappropriate as evidence of a li-
cense violation.'
1 6
Substantiality may vary depending on the kind of agency action in-
volved. There will be a heavier burden to prove substantial justifica-
tion in a license discipline case because of the interests involved than
in a permit denial or grant.Y
7
Attorney's fees and costs were awarded in Fieber v. Department of
Banking & Finance"8 to a licensed mortgage solicitor after the Depart-
ment of Banking and Finance dismissed its administrative complaint
against her. The hearing officer found that the only basis for proceed-
ing against Ms. Fieber had been one telephone interview fourteen
months earlier with a man who lodged a complaint against the invest-
ment company for whom Ms. Fieber had been working.119 This phone
110. 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2134 (1988).
111. Id. at 2145; FiA. STAT. § 57.105 (1989).
112. Alario, 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 2145; see also McCallister v. Department of State, 9
Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4064, 4070 (1987).
113. Alario, 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 2137.
114. Id. at 2137-38.
115. Id. at2144.
116. Id. at 2139.
117. See McCallister v. Department of State, 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4064, 4070 (1987). "[I]n
a disciplinary case against one's license, the test of reasonableness is measured against different
elements than are appropriate for an environmental case or where a party is denied retirement
benefits." Id.
118. 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5236 (1987).
119. Id. at 5244-45.
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call was the full extent of the Department's investigation before its
issuance of the administrative complaint.
The hearing officer was blunt:
A modicum of diligence would have disclosed Ms. Fieber's lack of
involvement in the alleged illegal practices .... It is apparent that in
its zeal to bring to justice the various individuals responsible for
State Capital's misdeeds, the Department cast its net of enforcement
far and wide, ensnaring the innocent, as well as the guilty.
20
The hearing officer concluded that the Act was precisely intended to
remedy such overreaching by an agency.'
2'
Nevertheless, the burden on the agency to show substantial justifi-
cation is by no means insurmountable. The First District Court of Ap-
peal reversed the hearing officer's award of attorney's fees and costs
in Department of Professional Regulation v. Toledo Realty'22 because
the hearing officer had improperly concluded "that only the transcript
of the probable cause panel's proceeding was admissible in a determi-
nation of whether the agency was substantially justified in initiating
the disciplinary complaint."' 12 The court held that the hearing officer
should have taken the Division's investigative file into account in de-
termining whether the Department's actions were substantially justi-
fied, disagreeing with the initial finding that "there was no evidence
that the investigative report was reviewed by the probable cause
panel.' 1 24 It was sufficient that the probable cause memorandum of
the panel contained a statement that the panel reviewed the investiga-
tive file in reaching a determination.
12
1
Elsewhere, HRS was found to be substantially justified in denying a
child care license to an applicant on the basis of three indicated re-
ports of neglect and abuse that had not been substantiated. 26 The Di-
vision of Licensing was likewise found to be substantially justified in
seeking to revoke the detection of deception license of a polygraph
examiner on the strength of a department investigation, which the
parties stipulated was adequate, and the sworn statements of three
120. Id. See also Cosyns v. Department of Prof. Reg., 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3948 (1989).
But see Green v. Department of Prof. Reg., 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 330 (1985).
121. Fieber, 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 5245.
122. 549 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
123. Id. at 716; see also Assad v. Department of Prof. Reg., 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4076,
4083 (1987).
124. Toledo, 549 So. 2d at 717.
125. Id.
126. Miller v. Department of HRS, 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5160, 5166 (1987).
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women alleging that the examiner had "strayed well beyond the ethi-
cal standards required of a polygraph examiner." 127
Although an agency has a heavier burden of showing substantial
justification in the license discipline area, an agency must operate
within certain limits of reasonableness even in the permitting context.
To illustrate, fees and costs were awarded to a home health agency in
Home Health Care v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services 28 because HRS had not been substantially justified in deny-
ing Home Health's application for a certificate of need to operate a
home health agency in Bay County. HRS had denied the certificate
because Home Health had failed to demonstrate the existence of an
unmet need for such a facility in the community.1 29 The hearing offi-
cer found "a policy requiring an applicant to meet a negative burden
of proof is unreasonable. It imposes a standard which is virtually im-
possible for an applicant to meet.' 30 Both the hearing officer in the
underlying proceeding and in the proceeding for attorney's fees and
costs concluded that "DHRS' preliminary decision had no reasonable
basis in law or fact at the time it was made."
'13'
3. Who Bears the Burden of Proving Substantial Justification?
Section 57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes, provides that "[a] proceeding
is substantially justified if it had a reasonable basis in law and fact at
the time it was initiated by a state agency." However, no mention is
made of who must prove substantial justification. The final order in
Department of Professional Regulation v. Webster'3 2 elaborated on
the different burdens of proof of the parties under the Act. The hear-
ing officer concluded that the petitioner must establish that he is a
small business party and that he prevailed in the original proceeding.
The burden then shifts to the agency, which must prove that its ac-
tions were substantially justified or that special circumstances would
make an award of fees and costs unjust.
1 33
The First District Court of Appeal in Gentele agreed and elabo-
rated. The court held that placing the burden of proof on the agency
127. McCallister v. Department of State, 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4064, 4071 (1987).
128. 33 Fla. Supp. 2d 169 (DOAH 1988).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 173.
131. Id.
132. 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3016 (1988).
133. Id; see also Department of Prof. Reg. v. Toledo Realty, 549 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA
1989); Romaguera v. Department of Prof. Reg., 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 929, 931-32 (1988);
Structured Shelters Fin. Management v. Department of Bank. & Fin., 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep.
382 (1987); Green v. Department of Prof. Reg., 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 330 (1985).
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was justified by the plain language of the statute. Section 57.111 (4)(a)
provides that "fees and costs 'shall' be awarded to a prevailing small
business party." The Act creates only two exceptions to a mandatory
award-the actions were substantially justified or special circum-
stances would make an award unjust. The court reasoned that the
agency is in the best position to know the facts and the legal basis for
its prior actions. Likewise, it is also in the best position to know
whether special circumstances exist that would make an award unjust.
Therefore, it is proper to place the burden on the agency.
34
Green v. Department of Professional Regulation'35 is troublesome
on this point. There the hearing officer stated that:
petitioners have the burden of establishing entitlement to the fees
and costs. Other than reciting that they were the prevailing party,
they have failed to point to any aspect of the complaint or
proceeding which would demonstrate that the agency action was an
'unreasonable governmental action' or had no basis in law or fact. 36
This seems to be placing the burden on the petitioner to show that the
agency's action was not substantially justified. To the extent that this
is a proper interpretation, the hearing officer was mistaken. A proper
interpretation of this case, however, is that the factual allegations con-
tained in the recommended order in the underlying case were suffi-
cient to meet the agency's burden of presenting some evidence to show
a reasonable basis in law or fact for its actions. Therefore, the agency
satisfied its burden while the petitioner failed to present any evidence
whatsoever to rebut the agency's evidence. Consequently, the peti-
tioner lost.
4. What is Meant by Special Circumstances?
The issue of what is meant by "special circumstances which would
make an award unjust" was addressed in Robaina v. Division of Pro-
fessional Regulation.3 7 There a barber was charged in an administra-
tive complaint with operating a barber shop without a shop license.
Although he had the necessary barber's license and occupational li-
censes, he did not obtain a shop license because he did not understand
that this license was also required. 38 When he was visited by a DPR
134. Gentele v. Department of Prof. Reg., 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 310, 327 (1986); see also
Toledo Realty, 549 So. 2d at 717.
135. 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 330 (1985).
136. Id. at 334.
137. 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4072, 4073 (1987).
138. Id.
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investigator who explained the requirement, he applied for and ob-
tained a shop license.
39
An element of the charge to be proved was that the violation was
"willful or repeated."' 14° The agency argued that each day Mr. Ro-
baina operated his shop without the necessary license was a separate
violation, and the violation was therefore repeated.14' It further con-
tended that "the novelty of the argument should be considered a 'spe-
cial circumstance' defined in Federal case law as the good faith
advancement of a novel but creative extension and interpretation of
the law.'
1 42
The hearing officer was unconvinced. She reasoned that the effect
of such an argument would be to apply retroactively a subsequent
amendment to the barber licensing statutes that made it illegal to own
or operate an unlicensed barbershop. "Special circumstances making
the award unjust do not exist," she wrote. 43
Good faith arguments for changes in established interpretations of
law that act to make current statutes retroactively applicable are not
"special circumstances" under the Act. Little else can be said, for an
agency is yet to be successful with this exception. Overall, agencies
rely instead on the "substantially justified" exception. The parame-
ters of the second exception remain to be defined.
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The prevailing small business party has sixty days after becoming
the prevailing party to file a petition for an award. 144 Included with
the petition must be copies of all relevant documents and an itemized
affidavit executed by the attorney in the initial proceeding that reveals
the nature and extent of the services rendered by the attorney as well
as the costs incurred in preparations, motions, hearings, and appeals
in the proceeding. 45
The agency has twenty days to file a response identifying those is-
sues it wishes to dispute and a counteraffidavit specifying each item of
cost and fee in dispute. 4' Facts supporting its position must be stated





143. Id. at 4075.
144. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(b)2 (1989).
145. Id. § 57.111(4)(b)1; FLA. ADnm. CODE r. 221-6.035 (1990).
146. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(c) (1989); FLA. ADhnN. CODE r. 221-6.035(4), (5)(a) (1990).
147. FA. AzDm. CODE r. 221-6.035(5)(b) (1990).
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sires. The petitioner then has ten days to request an evidentiary hear-
ing if neither party has done so up to this point.1'
If no hearing has been requested, the hearing officer may schedule a
hearing sua sponte149 Otherwise, the officer assigned will decide for
or against the award and the amount based on the pleadings and sup-
porting documents. 50
Either party may appeal an adverse decision.'-" If an award is
granted and the agency does'not appeal, the agency has thirty days to
tender payment to the petitioner or the petitioner may petition the cir-
cuit court for a writ of mandamus. 15 2 Any additional costs and fees
incurred in doing so may be added to the award.
5 3
A. Filing
A petition for an award of attorney's fees must be made within
sixty days after the small business party becomes a prevailing small
business party. 15 4 Exactly when to start and stop counting has been a
problem. For example, a medical doctor's petition for attorney's fees
and costs was dismissed as untimely in Tully v. Department of Profes-
sional Regulation'55 because the Department filed its voluntary dis-
missal on March 10, 1987, and the doctor's petition was not filed until
May 21, 1987. The hearing officer found that the sixty days began to
run when the voluntary dismissal was filed because "a Voluntary Dis-
missal by the party bearing the burden of proof dismisses a cause by
operation of law as of the date of filing of the Voluntary Dis-
missal."' 5 6 Petitioner then argued that the sixty-day time limit applied
only to attorney's fees and not to costs. The hearing officer was un-
convinced. "[A]ccepted rules of statutory construction support the
concept that the drafters of such specific legislation clearly intended
that failure to claim costs within 60 days is as fatal to the untimely
Petition as is the failure to claim attorneys'fees within 60 days.'
5 7
148. Id. r. 221-6.035(6).
149. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(d) (1989); FLA. ADnmq. CODE r. 221-6.035(7) (1990).
150. FLA. ADmI. CODE r. 221-6.035(7) (1990).
151. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(d) (1989).
152. Id. § 57.111(5).
153. Id.
154. Id. § 57.111(4)(b)2; see, e.g., Heisler v. Department of Prof. Reg., 11 Fla. Admin. L.
Rep. 3309 (1989); Rindley v. Department of Prof. Reg., 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 302 (1986);
Ruffin v. Department of Prof. Reg., 8 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1312 (1986).
155. 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5182 (1987).
156. Id. at 5183; See also Rindley v. Department of Prof. Reg., 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 302,
305 (1986).
157. Tully, 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 5188-89.
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The issue of exactly when a party becomes a prevailing party also
arose in Alario v. Department of Professional Regulation. 58 There the
Commission filed its final order on December 11, 1986. However, the
Department of Professional Regulation appealed the order and, when
the order was affirmed, petitioned for rehearing. The appellate court's
Mandate was issued on September 3, 1987. The petition was filed fif-
teen days later. The hearing officer found that the petitioners became
prevailing parties the date the Mandate was issued. However, this
original petition was deficient in several respects; the hearing officer
granted permission to amend. Subsequently, the amended petition was
filed more than sixty days after the petitioner became a prevailing
small business party, but the officer ruled that it would have been a
"gross abuse of discretion to have denied the amendment and ignored
the general rule liberally allowing amendment of pleadings" in "the
absence of any showing of prejudice to DPR."' 15 9
Elsewhere, the petitioner did not receive a copy of the final order or
notification of its filing until after the sixty days had already passed.
60
The hearing officer ruled that the time limit did not begin to run until
the petitioner or the petitioner's attorney received a copy of the final
order, relying on the doctrine of equitable tolling. The hearing officer
found the doctrine applicable in situations where the litigant is not at
fault for any untimeliness in filing.
61
The sixty-day filing deadline is not interpreted as jurisdictional by
DOAH. The petitioner in Ruffin v. Department of Professional
Regulation'62 was granted leave to amend her petition even though the
original petition had been filed sixty-two days after the agency's final
order. She subsequently filed her amended petition more than three
days after the ten days she had been granted. Notwithstanding these
two late filings, the hearing officer proceeded to explain the other rea-
sons that made the dismissal of her complaint appropriate. 163
The information that must be set forth in a petition for attorney's
fees and costs is detailed in Rule 221-6.035 of the Florida Administra-
tive Code. The rule also specifies the documents that should be copied
and attached to the petition. Along with the petition and copies of
documents submitted, the petitioner must include an itemized affida-
158. 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2134 (1988).
159. Id. at 2143.
160. Hardy v. Department of Prof. Reg., 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5174 (1989).
161. Id. at 5180 (1989). Cf. Jewell v. Department of Prof. Reg., 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep.
2128 (1988) (60-day period calculated from the date on the certificate of service showing mailing
of the final order to the parties).
162. 8 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1312 (1986).
163. Id. at 1315.
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vit executed by the attorney in the initial proceeding.'1' The affidavit
must state the nature, extent, and monetary value of the services ren-
dered by the attorney as well as the costs incurred in preparation, mo-
tions, hearings, and appeals in the proceeding. For example, in
Tully,16 schedules itemizing costs incurred were attached to Dr. Tul-
ly's petition. However, the petition was not verified and no affidavit
was attached. Although decided on other grounds, the hearing officer
stated that the submission was insufficient to satisfy the requirements
of the statute.'6
Apparently, filing a petition before the clock begins to tick on the
sixty-day limit is permissible as long as it has become relatively certain
who will prevail. In Heisler v. Department of Professional Regula-
tion, 67 a contractor filed a petition for attorney's fees and costs
within sixty days after the Board met and adopted the order recom-
mending dismissal of the administrative complaint but before entry of
a final order. l6 The final order, in fact, was not entered for more
than six months. 1 9 The hearing officer found that the petitioner's fil-
ing was timely "under the facts of this case,' ' 70 although it was still
necessary for the petitioner to file a copy of the Board's final order in




"The state agency may oppose the application for the award of at-
torney's fees and costs by affidavit.' ' 72 The agency has twenty days
after the filing of the petition in which to file a response. 173 The re-
sponse must state whether the agency seeks an evidentiary hearing and
on what grounds it opposes the award of attorney's fees and costs.
Grounds for opposing the award include:
1. That costs and attorney's fees claimed in the affidavit are
unreasonable;
2. That the petitioner is not a prevailing small business party;
3. That the agency's actions were substantially justified;
164. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(b)1 (1989); FLA. ADmIN. CODE r. 221-6.035(3) (1990).
165. 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5182 (1987).
166. d. at 5183.
167. 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3309 (1989).
168. Id. at 3311.
169. Id. at 3312.
170. Id. at 3319.
171. Id.
172. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(c) (1989).
173. FLA. ADxN. CODE r. 221-6.035(5)(a) (1990).
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4. That circumstances exist which would make the award unjust; or
5. That the agency was a nominal party only.17
4
In Heisler,75 the Construction Industry Licensing Board failed to
file a response as required under the statute and the rules. The agency,
by its omission, failed to place in dispute any allegation in the petition
and waived its right to dispute any of the allegations. 7 6 The hearing
officer found that the Department failed to file the required response
because it had improperly decided for itself that the petition was le-
gaily deficient and chose to ignore it. " Similarly, in Jewell the peti-
tioner's attorney's fees and costs were found to be reasonable because
the Division of Real Estate failed to file a counteraffidavit or response
questioning their reasonableness.1
78
The agency must state the facts supporting its grounds with particu-
larity. 17 9 Additionally, the agency must either admit to the reasonable-
ness of the fees and costs claimed or file a counteraffidavit along with
its response. The counteraffidavit must specify each item of cost and
fee in dispute. 180 If the agency does not request an evidentiary hearing
and petitioner has not yet done so, the petitioner has ten days from
the time the agency's response is filed to request a hearing.'8 '
If no hearing is requested, the hearing officer may schedule a hear-
ing sua sponte. Otherwise, the officer assigned will decide for or
against the award and the amount, if any, based on the pleadings and
supporting documents.8 2 Any hearing, whether requested or sched-
uled sua sponte, is to be conducted promptly. If the court is conduct-
ing the hearing, the court shall issue a judgment. If a hearing officer
conducts the hearing, the hearing officer shall issue a final order that
is reviewable under chapter 120. However, if the agency appeals an
award and the court affirms in whole or in part, it may, in its discre-
tion, award additional attorney's fees and costs for the appeal. 83
174. Id.
175. 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3309 (1989).
176. Id. at 3320. See also Department of Prof. Reg. v. Webster, 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep.
3016 (1988).
177. Heisler, 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 3319-20.
178. Jewell v. Department of Prof. Reg., 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2128, 2131 (1988); see
generally Webster, 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 3016.
179. FLA. ArDuN. CODE r. 221-6.035(5)(b) (1990).
180. Id. r. 221-6.035(4).
181. Id. r. 221-6.035(6).
182. Id. r. 221-6.035(7).
183. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(d) (1989).
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C. Exceptions
There are some situations specifically precluding or limiting recov-
ery under the statute. First, no award will be made in any case in
which the state agency was only a nominal party.18 Second, no award
can be made in excess of $15,000.185 Third, the statute is not applica-
ble to any proceeding establishing a rate or a rule or any action sound-
ing in tort. 186 Finally, the statute applies only to actions initiated by a
state agency after July 1, 1984.187
D. The Award
If an award is made, the state agency has thirty days after the date
that the order or judgment becomes final to pay the judgment. 8 8 If it
fails to do so, the petitioner may petition the circuit court where the
subject matter of the underlying action arose for enforcement of the
award by writ of mandamus. If this becomes necessary, the state may
also be required to pay any additional attorney's fees and costs in-
curred for issuance of the writ. 189
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined Florida's Equal Access to Justice Act,
as well as the court cases and DOAH final orders interpreting it. As
stated earlier, the Act was designed to deter unwarranted state agency
action against small business parties who must deal with them. It is
relatively short and straightforward with few hidden dangers. Why
then are there so few cases? And of those who have petitioned, why
are there so few recoveries?
The small number of petitions may be an indication that the Act is
effective in accomplishing its goal-deterring unjustified agency ac-
tion. The Act draws a line beyond which agencies may not go without
leaving themselves open to petitions under the Act. The agencies have
184. Id. § 57.111(4)(d)1; see also Weller Enters. v. Department of Labor & Employ. Sec., 11
Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 5182 (1989).
185. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(d)2 (1989).
186. Id. § 57.111(6)(a).
187. Id. § 57.111(6)(b). See also Rindley v. Department of Prof. Reg., 9 Fla. Admin. L.
Rep. 302 (1986). In Weller, 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 5183-84, an employer petitioned for
attorney's fees and costs after successfully defending against a claim for unemployment compen-
sation filed against it by a former employee. The hearing officer found the Department had been
only a nominal party, in that it had done no more than provide a forum in which the parties
could resolve an unemployment compensation dispute as required by law and dismissed the peti-
tion.
188. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(5) (1989).
189. Id.
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learned where that line is and are staying behind it. Or is it that the
line is drawn in a place that renders the Act practically useless to those
who must deal with state agencies? Perhaps the agencies have learned
to leave the necessary paper trail to validate their actions. Is the
commentator' 90 who expressed doubt of the Act's efficacy on to some-
thing?
Determining just where the truth lies would be difficult, if not im-
possible. However, it is certain that the protection afforded by the
Act, while dubious, is certainly better than nothing at all. To the ex-
tent the Act forces state agencies to at least have the necessary paper-
work to justify their actions, it does serve as a sword for small
business parties.191 A small sword perhaps, but a sword nevertheless.
But if iron rusts from disuse,' 92 it remains important for the compe-
tent practitioner to remember that the Act is available lest the agencies
forget where the line is or that the line exists.
190. See Powell, supra note 9.
191. See Smawley, supra note 8.
192. EMmY M. BECK, BARTTr's QUOTATIONS 174 (Emily M. Beck, ed., 14th ed. 1968)
(quoting LEONARDO DA VINcI, NomEBooKs, c. 1500).
